[...]me” to “around here”

(how can we stop in art to) recreate exploitative patterns from the past (?)

ecological imagination is a turn towards reciprocity and relationship

in Kinect the path of a journey is refracted, mirroring a critical site of refraction, as a practice. walking with Hanno in the Amazon forest is a joyful and critical engagement through a form of practice that resists universalizing tendencies.

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tree is never tree-like (filial, Arborescent, versus rhizomatic)
vertical vs. lateral
Arborescent vs. reticulated (like the patterns on a giraffe or spots on the python)
stake at “relationships”



how can we problematize narcissism? what if it is the wrong word describing a certain property of life? Narcissus is recognizing himself in his environment and he dissolves himself in that image. the main thing about this story is that he is most alive via the story, Narcissus is basically undead.

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close-range vision

how can we practice movement and touch in the physio-locality of the eyes?
tentacularity
touching was considered a cruder scanning at close range and seeing a more subtle touching at a distance
importance of far distance over close range => refer to project Standing on the Shoulders of Giants (2015, Sina)

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forest's “space”

Hernri Lefebvre distinguishes Representation of space and Representational spaces. ... Representational spaces are “directly lived” through associated images and symbols which overlay physical space, making symbolic use of its objects.

Representation is a distinctive manner of imagining the real, and is a fundamental phenomenon upon which all culture rests.

or instead of how a forest looks like, what is the forest made of? and for whom? what is the forest made of is the matter of negotiation (between the different kinds of beings who think differently about the forest)

in order not to neutralise the forest to culture (cultural history as an explanatory priority to the historically contingent circumstances) we can propose two questions of older critique of perspectival perception:
1. that the body accounts for perspective (?)
2. representation is exclusively mental (?)
of course both questions are phenomenological positions, but that does not mean that we no longer need representation to understand relationality. (Konh words)

needing or not needing representation to understand relationality

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(Latour)

not a philosophical argument, but a cabinet of curiosities assembled by “friends of interpretable objects”

... not an encyclopedic undertaking ... we have chosen only those sites, objects, and situations where there is ambiguity, a hesitation, an iconoclash on how to interpret image-making and image-breaking. (going to sites or objects where there is ambiguity, hesitation)

(the exhibition is not about recollecting truth or objectivity)

christian religious paintings that do not try to show anything but, on the contrary, to obscure the vision.

redirecting the attention away from the image to the prototype (Platonism run mad?) -- redirecting of attention to another image

are we really going to spend another century naively re-destroying and deconstructing images that are so intelligently and subtly destroyed already?

do we really have to spend another century alternating violently between constructivism and realism, between artificiality and authenticity?
science deserves better than naive worship and naive contempt. its regime of invisibility is uplifting as that of religion and art. the subtlety of its traces requires a new form of care and attention.

(we need new forms of attention)

the more artifactual the inscription, the better its ability to connect, to ally with others, to generate even better objectivity (Kinect?)

Kinect recordings as ethnography?
how to escape from the tyranny of “simply objective”, “purely representative” quasi-scientific illustrations? Freeing one's gaze from this dual obligation accounts....


religious icons and their obsession for real presence
they have never been about presenting something other than absence

scientific imagery
no isolated scientific image has any mimetic power; there is nothing less representational, less figurative, than the pictures produced by science, which are nonetheless said to give us the best grasp of the visible world.

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is Aruz (عروض) interface? surface/face and meaning/inhalt/content dualism in Tasavof, Rumi breakings of Aruz. Tsavof believes that only through appearance one can get into the depth


science, religion, and politics all three take for granted an image of nature.

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(Peter Galison, in iconoclash)

wanting to know with eyes-open

it was by way of intuition “that the mathematical world remains In contact with the real world; and even though pure mathematics could do without it, it is always necessary to come back to intuition to bridge the abyss which separates symbol from reality.”

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(Dipesh Chakrabarty)

(history of nature?) the nature of history as a form of knowledge

(Croce essay 1893 history subsumed under the concept of art) Croce drew on the writings of Ernst Mach and Henri Poincare to argue that “the concepts of the natural sciences are human constructs elaborated for human purposes.” “when we peer into nature, we find only ourselves” we do not “understand ourselves best as part of the natural world” (is that not the image of Narcissus who looks into the nature and can only see himself--nature observation as mirror stage)
so as Roberts puts it “Croce proclaimed that there is no world but the human world, then took over the central doctrine of Vico that we can know the human world because we have made it.”
Croce's idealism “does not mean that rocks, for example, ‘don't exist’ without human beings to think about them. apart from human concern and language, they neither exist nor do not exist, since ‘exist’ is a human concept that has meaning only within a context of human concerns and purposes” (not saying human symbolic system of thought)

man environment did change but changed so slowly as to make the history of man's relation to his environment almost timeless and thus not a subject of historiography at all. ***

the history of man's relationship to the environment was so slow as to be almost timeless

but now scholars are writing significantly different: destroying the artificial but time-honored distinction between natural and human histories, climate scientists posit that the human beings has become something much larger than the simple biological agent that he or she always has been.

vision of man “as a prisoner of climate” and not of man as the maker of it

is the Anthropocene a critique of the narratives of freedom?
price we pay for the pursuit of freedom

politics: the most common shape that freedom takes in human societies.
politics has never been based on reason alone. (it seems politics is something that is out of control)
(Maslin, Global warming) [Global warming] requires nations and regions to plan for the next 50 years, something that most societies are unable to do because of the very short-term nature of politics.

Anthropocene was neither an ancient nor an inevitable happening

the crisis of climate change calls for thinking simultaneously on both registers, to mix together the immiscible chronologies of capital and species history.

as Gadamer pointed out, Dilthey saw “the individual's private world of experience as the starting point for an expansion that, in a living transposition, fills out the narrowness and fortuitousness of his private experience with the infinity of what is available by re-experiencing the historical world.”

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(Peter Galison, in Image of Objectivity)

“let nature speak for itself” (!) a new brand of scientific objectivity that emerged in the 19th century => restrain themselves from imposing their hopes, expectations, generalization, aesthetics, even ordinary langu[...]