[...]eny meaning and bodies, but in order to live in meanings and bodies that have a chance for a future. (reductionism='qstn'>?)

insist on the ="trms">embodied ="trms">nature of all vision, and so reclaim the sensory ="trms">system that has been used to signify a leap out of the marked body and into a conquering gaze from nowhere. (how the exhibition can make visible my ="trms">positing in the work='qstn'>? ground me in an ="trms">embodied vision='qstn'>? my ="trms">situation. to ="trms">situate me. not necessarily organic ="trms">embodiment='qstn'>? what have i need to learn in my bodies='qstn'>?)

="trms">perverse capacity of the eye

culture dis="trms">embodies. (="trms">nature ="trms">embodies='qstn'>?)
to distance the knowing subject from everybody and everything

visualizing ="trms">technologies are without (apparent) limit='qstn'>?

="large lg2" stl="font-size:111%"> linked to='lgc'>:
="prgrph">-artificial graphic manipulation ="trms">systems
="prgrph">-computer aided scanners
="prgrph">-colour enhancement ="trms">techniques

mapping is at stake. what kind of mapping the Kinect image provides='qstn'>? that is op="trms">posite to the zeiss lens='qstn'>?

how to go there with the ="trms">technology and not fuck the ="trms">world='qstn'>? carefully not give birth to mythical ideological seeing or promising transcendence

Kinect's generative, but not devouring vision

the ="trms">perversion of the zeiss lens is in that it tries to let the viewer ‘experience’ the moment of discovery in immediate vision of the ‘object’

the exhibition is about a ="trms">writing of the body that ="trms">="trms"nttrm="metaph,metamorph,metabol,metal">metaphorically emphasizes vision
= and commit to deconstruction and passionate construction.
= and passionate detachment, which is dependent on the impossibility of innocent ‘identity’ politics and ="trms">epistemologies as strategies for seeing from (any) standpoints, in order to see well. (refer to ="trms">lecture-performance Standing on the Shoulders of Giants - ="frds">Sina ="frds">Seifee 2015, on a critical ="trms">epistemology of seeing-from-far)
= whom to see with='qstn'>?

="ppl">="ppl">Haraway='lgc'>: only partial perspective promises objective vision. This is an objective vision that initiates, rather than closes off, the problem of ="trms">responsibility for the generativity of all visual practices.

The ‘eyes’ made available in ="trms">modern ="trms">technological ="trms">sciences shatter any idea of passive vision='qstn'>? these prosthetic devices show us that all eyes, in="trms"nttrm="cluster,club">cluding our own organic ones, are active perceptual ="trms">systems, building in ="trms">translations and ="trms">specific ways of seeing, that is, ways of life.


partial way of organizing ="trms">worlds

is unlocatable ir="trms">responsible='qstn'>?
is my visual exhibition a knowl="trms"nttrm="knowledge,Knowledge">edge claim='qstn'>?

To see from below (or the perspective of the mathematics, Kinect, hacker='qstn'>?) is neither easily learned nor unproblematic

ways of being nowhere while claiming to see comprehensively (i did not claim any of these - i didn't try even. i was there ="trms">traveling with ="trms">relation to my co-="trms">travelers and a ="trms">technology ="trms">relation) my issue with the images is their generality and perhaps that is their unlocatablilty. but to ="trms">situate my knowl="trms"nttrm="knowledge,Knowledge">edge and myself i am not solely depending on the image ="trms">rhetoric. i was committed to mobile ="trms">positioning, and that is critical.


mediate vision

knowl="trms"nttrm="knowledge,Knowledge">edge potent for constructing ="trms">worlds
trying to be less organized by axes of domination

="trms">Science has been utopian and visionary from the start='qstn'>? that is one reason ‘we’ need it.

="large lg1" stl="font-size:130%"> my eye were ="trms">crafted by the blood of mosquitoes...

="trms">translations and exchanges, ="trms">material and ="trms">semiotic
what has the property of ="trms">systematicity in my Amazon='qstn'>?
orientations and ="trms">responsibility in ="trms">material ="trms">semiotic fields of meaning.

is Here, Kinect's vision not immediately a very powerful ="trms">="trms"nttrm="metaph,metamorph,metabol,metal">metaphor or ="trms">technology (for political ="trms">epistemological clarification)='qstn'>?

The visual ="trms">="trms"nttrm="metaph,metamorph,metabol,metal">metaphor invites us to investigate the varied ="trms">apparatuses of visual production, in="trms"nttrm="cluster,club">cluding the prosthetic ="trms">technologies ="trms">interfaced with our biological eyes and brains.

should i have an argue for (politics and) ="trms">epistemologies of location, ="trms">positioning, and ="trms">situating='qstn'>?

view from a structuring and structured body

we ="trms">love stuttering, and the partly understood

="trms">Translation is always ="trms">interpretative, critical, and partial

Amazon (location) resists (the politics of) closure

logic of culture (="trms">nature made flexible)

="trms">science ="trms">coded body
black ="trms">coded body
colonised ="trms">coded body
="trms">coded as self sufficient (when='qstn'>?)



the project and me are not boundary object (i am not tarzan)

suppress the lost text of aristotle on the ="trms">rhetoric of humor


how can something work and not work='qstn'>?!

mathematical competition


what is the other ="trms">story (of forest, journey, etc.) that i want urgently tell='qstn'>?
or the rhythm of what ="trms">story i want to change='qstn'>?

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In 1905 the French ="trms">neurologists G. Deny and P. Camus recounted the case of Madame I who had lost body awareness. She described her “general insensibility” as follows='lgc'>: “I'm no longer aware of myself as I used to be. I can no longer feel my arms, my legs, my head, and my hair. I have to touch myself constantly in order to know how I am. I have the feeling that my entire body is changed, even at times that it no longer exists. I touch an object, but it is not I who am touching it. I no longer feel as I used to. I cannot find myself. I cannot ="trms">imagine myself. My insensibility is f="trms"nttrm="righ,rigo,riga,rigi,trig,rign">rightening, as if everything were empty.” Madame I was unable to recognize the ="trms">position of her arms and legs and was completely insensitive to pain. ="trms">According to Israel ="ppl">Rosenfeld's thesis, Madame I was unable to know her body as part of her ="trms">memory. (her brain could not create a ="nms">body image) She could not ="trms">imagine, or create in her mind, images of parents or the houses where she had lived. Lacking a continuous image of herself, she could re-create momentary images only when she was verifying to herself that she had a body. (see Strange, Familiar and Forgotten pp 40-42)

“If all self-reference were destroyed, consciousness and understanding would not be possible.

“Meaning and understanding are parts of the structure of consciousness that emerge from self-reference; they cannot exist without a ="nms">body image.” (p.55)

“Self-reference is not a hypothetical idea but a de="trms">monstrable part of the structure of consciousness; a partial breakdown in the physiological mechanisms that create it give us the ="trms">phenomenon of ="nms">phantom limbs.” (p.56)



Two English ="trms">neurologists, Lord Russell Brain and Henry Head (!) coined the phrase “="nms">body image” for the ="trms">internal image and ="trms">memory of one's body in space and time. The ="nms">body image is not only a picture of the body but also an anticipatory plan for the detailed movements of the body, and rather than a fixed structure, it is dynamic and plastic, capable of reorganizing itself radically with the ="trms">contingencies of experience.

="large lg3" stl="font-size:112%"> The ="nms">body image can also incorporate external object, implements, and ="trms">instruments. When they are being used, they can become intimate, vital, even libidinally cathected parts of the ="nms">body image.



(Don ="ppl">="ppl">Ihde='lgc'>:) “To ="trms">embody one's praxis through ="trms">technologies is ultimately an existential ="trms">relation with the ="trms">world.” (="trms">Technology and Life="trms">world, p.72)

="large lg4" stl="font-size:112%"> ="trms">Embodied ="trms">relations such as the experience of “seeing through” glasses (or the use of hearing aids, blind man's cane, or driving a car) take the ="trms">technology into the perceptual-bodily self-experience. The mediating ="trms">technology becomes part of the ="nms">body image, and achieves “="trms">instrumental transparency”

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(="ppl">Giuliana ="ppl">Bruno)

This tangible, superficial contact, in fact, is what allows us to apprehend the objects and the spaces of art, turning contact into the ="trms">communicative ="trms">interface of a public intimacy. (but not in the Amazonian skin contact) (it is ="trms">different than ="ppl">="ppl">Lucretius reflecting upon the ="trms">nature of things)

="large lg5" stl="font-size:119%"> (="trms">materiality of) cultural surfaces

As a form of dwelling that engages mediation between subjects and with objects, the surface also can be viewed as a site for screening and projection.

The surfaces of the screens that surround us today express a new ="trms">materiality as they convey the virtual transformation of our ="trms">material ="trms">relations. And these screens, which have become ="trms">membranes of contact, exist in our environments in close ="trms">relation to the surfaces of canvas and walls—also undergoing a process of substantial transformation. And so it is here—in this meeting place that is surface—t[...]